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Grasping the Intangible: How to Interpret “Articles” Under the Tariff Act and ClearCorrect 
Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n 
Christopher P. Mazza 
 
The exponential rate of advancement of technology in recent years has made it difficult 
to apply antiquated statutes to situations and devices that could not possibly have been 
contemplated at the time the statutes were written.  This predicament has forced the modern 
judiciary and other agencies capable of statutory interpretation to stretch the meaning of words 
within statutes and expand the traditional understanding of those statutes.  This comment 
addresses one such issue: the interpretation of, and thus the jurisdiction over, “articles” as read 
in Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §1337 (“Section 337”).   
Section 337 deals with unfair practices in import trade and gives the International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) the ability to enact equitable remedies and issue remedial orders against 
products that infringe valid intellectual property in the United States.1  Most significant to the 
goal of this comment, Section 337 allows the ITC to cast a wide jurisdictional net over “articles 
that infringe” valid intellectual property.2  Viewed in light of the recent Federal Circuit decision 
in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC. V. Int’l Trade Comm’n,3 this comment will first introduce the 
reader to the overarching issue of electronic vs. physical importation of goods, review the general 
powers and procedures of the International Trade Commission, examine the ClearCorrect 
decision, and argue that the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc or, in the alternative, the Supreme 
                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Loyola College – Baltimore, MD.   
1 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012). 
2 Id.  
3 ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). 
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Court, should affirm the Federal Circuit panel’s decision and determine that electronic 
transmissions are not included under the umbrella of “articles,” and that the term “articles” is 
meant only to apply to tangible goods.  It will be shown that when Congress wrote Section 337, 
its unambiguous desire was for the International Trade Commission to have jurisdiction solely 
over tangible goods.  If Congress now wishes to grant the International Trade Commission vast 
powers that include jurisdiction over intangible goods and electronic data transmissions, it should 
amend Section 337 or create new legislation explicitly granting an agency, or multiple agencies 
acting in concert, the power to stop the importation of any good, whether tangible or intangible.  
To that end, the author has attempted to address some of the common concerns that may 
present themselves when attempting to control the importation of intangible, electronic 
transmissions.         
I. Introduction 
The roots of intellectual property protection in the United States date back to origins of 
the nation.  The founding fathers recognized that technology would best progress and new 
inventions would be encouraged if inventors were given the sole ability to exploit their inventions 
for a limited time.  Therefore, “in order to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,”4 
Congress granted inventors limited-time monopolies over the invention of a process, machine, 
article of manufacture, or composition of matter that was new, non-obvious, and useful.5  These 
limited monopolies became known as patents, and they give the patent holder the right to 
                                                          
4 U.S. Const., Art. I, §8. 
5 35 U.S.C. §101 (2012). 
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exclude others from copying his or her invention in exchange for a full disclosure that would allow 
a person of ordinary skill in the art to reconstruct the invention in question. 
When a patent holder seeks to exercise their monopolistic right in the patent’s subject 
matter against a perceived infringer they generally have two options.  The first is to bring an 
action against the accused infringer in federal district court, which has jurisdiction over all 
intellectual property disputes.6  However, this course of action has its limitations, notably 
because district courts must be concerned with the standing of the litigants and have the power 
to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.  The second option is used when an infringing product 
is partly or wholly made overseas and imported into the United States.  A patent holder can file 
a complaint with the ITC, whose remedies are much narrower than federal courts, and mainly 
include the ability to stop the importation of infringing goods before they enter the country 
through the use of remedial orders.7  The ITC also has the power to issue cease and desist orders 
to stop domestic parties from engaging in ongoing activities in the country; violation of these 
orders can carry with them substantial monetary penalties that can be recovered in District 
Court.8  Recently, many intellectual property rights holders have pursued actions before the ITC 
instead of the traditional route of going through the district courts because the ITC’s average 
length of litigation is much shorter than the time it takes a district court to resolve an issue: 
usually 12 to 16 months versus at least 2 to 3 years, respectively.9 
                                                          
6 28 U.S.C. §1338 (2012). 
7 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012). 
8 §1337(f). 
9 Mark A. Kressel, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights with the ITC, 34 L.A. LAW. at 10 (Dec. 2011). 
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With the advent of the World Wide Web and the proliferation of Internet commerce, 
interpretation of the statute that enables the ITC has become critical.  The enabling statute, the 
Tariff Act, gives the ITC the power to exclude the importation, sale for importation, or sale within 
the U.S. after importation of articles that either infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent or 
copyright; or are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process covered 
by the claims of a valid and enforceable U.S. patent.10  It is the term “articles,” that modifies the 
rest of the statute, which this comment is concerned with.  Traditionally, “articles” has been 
understood to encompass tangible goods, but the ITC has recently sought to extend the 
interpretation of this term to include intangible things, such as electronic transmissions of digital 
data sets.11 
A case recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit12 may have far-
reaching consequences on how the term “articles” is interpreted.  The case was a judicial review 
stemming from the ITC’s previous decision to interpret “articles” as including electronic data 
imported into the United States, thus giving the ITC jurisdiction over said electronic data.13  
Furthermore, another recently decided case entitled Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, also a 
judicial review of a prior decision of the ITC, held that it was permissible to exclude importation 
of tangible goods that were not infringing at the time of importation and were considered staple 
                                                          
10 §1337(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
11 ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 at 11 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). 
12 Id.  
13 In the Matter of Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment Plans for Use, in Making Incremental Dental 
Positioning Adjustment Appliances Made Therefrom, and Methods of Making the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833 (Apr. 
10, 2014). 
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goods, but became infringing products downstream when the staple good was combined with 
software that transformed it into an infringing product.14   
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, was sharply divided in its decision in Suprema.15  The 
6-4 decision showed the multitude of differing opinions on whether the ITC had the ability to 
stop the importation of tangible staple goods that would later be used in an infringing product,16 
specifically by the addition of electronic software to the tangible staple good.  In contrast, a split 
three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit in ClearCorrect decided that the ITC did not have the 
authority to stop the importation of electronically transmitted data that was later used in the 
United States to create an infringing product.17  When viewed together, these two decisions 
create an interesting uncertainty when it comes to determining whether the ITC can exclude an 
item that will be used downstream in a post-importation marriage of hardware and software, 
which has become an increasingly significant form of commerce.18  The sharp split in both cases 
also makes ClearCorrect ripe for granting a petition for en banc rehearing19 or, in the alternative, 
the chance for the Supreme Court to step in and settle the differing opinions of the Federal Circuit 
in both Suprema and ClearCorrect.20 
                                                          
14 Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., No. 2012-1170 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2015). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Darryl M. Woo, Wendy Wang, and Janice Ta, “Articles That Infringe?” International Implications of Suprema v. ITC 
and ClearCorrect v. ITC on Importation to the U.S., INSIDE COUNSEL (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/01/14/articles-that-infringe-international-implications#. 
18 Id. 
19 See Petition of Appellee International Trade Commission for Rehearing En Banc, ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2016).  
20 Suprema was not subject to Supreme Court review because no writ of certiorari was filed; however, if a writ of 
certiorari is filed and granted in ClearCorrect, it is anticipated that any decision from the Supreme Court will have 
consequences that clearly affect the Suprema case and the jurisdictional reach of the ITC.    
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This comment will review the powers granted to the International Trade Commission and 
will argue that the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, should affirm the panel’s 
decision not just on the battle of dictionary definitions enunciated in the majority opinion, but 
for a variety of other reasons.  One such reason is that the ITC has traditionally not been able to 
exert its reach in such a sweeping fashion.  Moreover, the legislators that wrote Section 337, 
using their understanding of technology at the time, did not intend for the statute to reach 
electronic transmissions.  Accordingly, Congress knowingly expressed their unambiguous intent 
that the statute not reach electronic transmissions when they wrote Section 337.21  The ITC has 
also traditionally not been able to exert its reach in such a sweeping fashion.   
Furthermore, allowing an interpretation of the ITC’s enabling statute that considers 
“articles that … infringe” to include intangible things would give the ITC the ability to improperly 
use existing patent and intellectual property law to police digital transmissions over the Internet 
and effectively expand the scope of exclusive rights granted to intellectual property rights 
holders.  It will also be suggested that even if the statute is interpreted to include electronic data, 
it is not feasible to enforce remedial orders issued by the ITC that cover electronic imports 
because of the limitations of Customs and Border Protection.22  If Congress wishes the ITC to be 
able to exclude the importation of electronic transmissions, Congress should make that clear 
through an amendment or revision to the existing Section 337 and providing a definition of the 
term “articles” that includes the transmission of digital data.  Finally, if Congress were to grant 
                                                          
21 ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 14-1527 at 3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2015). 
22 Andrew Haberman, Policing the Information Super Highway: Custom's Role in Digital Piracy, 2 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. 
BRIEF, 17, 21 (2011) (stating Customs should partner with ISPs to monitor Internet activity, but limitations include 
end-user’s privacy concerns and that new pirating methods rendering enforcement methods useless; nevertheless, 
Customs’ monitoring would be unable to detect infringing products being advertised as legitimate, particularly 
through online auction sites). 
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the ITC this power, it needs to provide the ITC with the means to enforce such orders through 
inter-agency cooperation and a pooling of resources throughout the government.    
II. Traditional Powers of the International Trade Commission  
The ITC is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that has broad investigative 
responsibilities in matters of international trade.  Originally, the ITC was established as the U.S. 
Tariff Commission in 1916 but assumed its current name along with its current scope of powers 
through the Trade Act of 1974.23  Like other administrative agencies, the ITC is a creature of 
statute; all of the powers of the agency must originate in a statutory grant of power to the 
agency.24  The main power of the ITC is, upon complaint, to adjudicate cases involving the 
importation of articles that allegedly infringe valid intellectual property rights in the United 
States, thus facilitating a rules-based international trading system.25  
The main enabling statute for the ITC as well as the statute being examined in this 
comment is 19 U.S.C. §1337 (“Section 337”).  The statute deals with unfair practices in import 
trade and gives the ITC the power to issue equitable remedies.26  Section 337 grants the ITC broad 
powers over the importation of all types of intellectual property including trademarks, mask 
works, designs, copyrights, and patents,27 but this comment is concerned specifically with only 
two subsections.  19 U.S.C. §1337(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii) deal with: 
The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or 
the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, 
importer, or consignee, of articles that –  
                                                          
23 See About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2015); 19 U.S.C. §2231 (2012). 
24 Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
25 See About the USITC, supra note 23. 
26 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012). 
27 Id. 
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(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent or a valid and 
enforceable United States copyright registered under title 17; or 
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a 
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United 
States patent.28 
Accordingly, without the importation of an “article,” there can be neither an unfair act nor 
anything for the ITC to remedy.     
The ITC also acts in a specific, statutorily-determined way when adjudicating issues before 
it.29  Upon complaint from a domestic party claiming that infringing materials are being imported 
into the United States, the commissioners of the ITC will determine whether to open an 
investigation.30  If an investigation is opened, notification must be published in the Federal 
Register and, within 45 days of the initiation of the investigation, the ITC must provide a target 
date for issuing its final determination.31  The investigation will include formal evidentiary 
hearings in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and provide the parties with 
adequate notice, the right to cross-examination, objections, and other rights required to have a 
fair hearing.32  Once the investigation is complete, the administrative law judge directing the 
investigation will rule on the merits of the case and whether he or she believes there to be a 
violation of Section 337, called an “initial determination.”33  The administrative law judge can 
only make recommendations to the ITC and not order the issuance of one of the equitable 
remedies at the ITC’s disposal.34   
                                                          
28 §1337(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 
29 §1337(b)-(c). 
30 Kressel, supra note 9, at 1. 
31 §1337(b)(1). 
32 THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUBLICATION NO. 4105, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (March 2009) at 2. 
33 Kressel, supra note 9, at 1.  
34 Id. 
10 
 
The ITC then decides whether to review the initial determination of the administrative 
law judge.  If the commission declines to review the initial determination, it becomes the final 
determination of the ITC.35  The ITC can also review and adopt, modify, or reverse the initial 
determination.36  If it is determined that Section 337 has been violated, the ITC can order 
remedial relief targeting the articles in question.37  Any person adversely affected by the final 
determination of the ITC in Section 337 investigations can, within 60 days after the determination 
becomes final, request judicial review before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.38 
Various federal agencies are involved once the ITC begins an investigation or issues a final 
determination.39  Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) through its Office of 
Investigations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) through its Cyber Crime Division, and 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) through its Office of Criminal Investigations are all 
responsible for investigations designed to assist law enforcement actions against those who 
commit violations of U.S. intellectual property laws.40  They are, however, mainly concerned with 
pharmaceuticals and items that could potentially cause a public health issue.41  The Department 
of Justice is responsible for prosecuting alleged violations.42  The agency most important to the 
substance of this comment is Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).  CBP acts as the ITC’s 
enforcement mechanism and has the power to inspect, deny entry to, and seize articles that have 
                                                          
35 THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 3. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; 19 U.S.C. §1337(b)-(g) (2012). 
38 §1337(c). 
39 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF 
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT HAS GENERALLY INCREASED, BUT ASSESSING 
PERFORMANCE COULD STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (March 2009). 
40 Id. at 2. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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been identified in exclusion orders issued by the ITC.43 
While district courts have jurisdiction over all intellectual property litigation, some key 
differences exist when attempting to secure a final determination from the ITC.  Most significant 
are the remedial relief measures available to the ITC including general and limited exclusion 
orders as well as cease and desist orders.44  Whereas a district court can directly award monetary 
damages as a civil remedy, the ITC does not have the power to do so, although violation of a 
cease and desist order can carry heavy fines.45 
A limited exclusion order applies only to the parties named in the investigation while a 
general exclusion order bars the importation of infringing products by anyone, regardless of 
whether they were a party in the ITC’s investigation.46  Because a general exclusion order 
potentially affects a greater number of people, one may only be issued if two conditions are 
met.47  The general exclusion order must be 1) necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited 
exclusion order; and 2) necessary to prevent a pattern of violation where it is difficult to identify 
the source of the infringing products.48   
There are further differences between exclusion orders and cease and desist orders.  
Whereas exclusion orders are generally considered in rem remedies,49 meaning that they are 
directed toward the infringing articles themselves, cease and desist orders are purely in 
                                                          
43 Gary M. Hnath, General Exclusion Orders Under Section 337, 25 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 349, 350 (2005). 
44 Kressel, supra note 9, at 2; 19 U.S.C. §1337(d) (2012). 
45 §1337(f). 
46 Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007); §1337(d). 
47 §1337(d). 
48 Id. 
49 See Kyocera, supra note 24, at 1357 (stating that although the parties argue exclusion orders have been considered 
strictly in rem in nature, a limited exclusion order that applies to “persons determined by the Commission to be 
violating this section” does in fact incorporate an in personam element); §1337(d)(2).  See also Michael J. Lyons et 
al., Exclusion of Downstream Products After Kyocera: A Revised Framework for General Exclusion Orders, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 821, 831-32 (2009). 
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personam in nature, meaning that they are directed to a specific party or person.50  A cease and 
desist order can bar someone from importing a certain article as well as curtail or hinder other 
activities such as sales and distribution of imported articles that infringe according to the ITC’s 
determination.51  While the ITC cannot order monetary damages like a district court, violation of 
a cease and desist order carries heavy monetary penalties.52  For each day that importation of 
articles, or their sale, in violation of the cease and desist order occurs, the party in violation can 
be penalized the greater of up to $100,000 or twice the domestic value of the articles entered or 
sold on such day in violation of the order.53  The accrued penalties are payable to the United 
States, and the ITC can recover them through a civil action in federal court in the district where 
the violation of the order occurred.54 
A. Limitations of Customs and Border Protection 
 As mentioned supra, CBP is the agency that the ITC relies on to enforce its remedial 
orders.55  Traditionally, CBP has been able to accomplish this through air, land, and sea patrols at 
the nation’s borders.  This is how an exclusion order issued by the ITC is enforced: CBP agents are 
granted the power to inspect and, if necessary, seize or deny entry to any goods within the scope 
of the exclusion order.56  This method of regulating the importation of physical goods to the 
                                                          
50 See Fuji Photo Film, supra note 46, at 1286; 19 U.S.C. §1337(f)(1) (2012). 
51 §1337(f)(1). 
52 §1337(f)(2). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See supra text accompanying Section II. 
56 Hnath, supra note 43, at 350.   
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United States has proven to be effective, with CBP seizing over 23,000 items valued at 
approximately $1.25 billion in fiscal year 2014.57   
However, despite being the nation’s largest law enforcement agency,58 CBP has 
limitations on its ability to police America’s “cyber borders” for potentially infringing content that 
is being electronically transmitted into the country.59  CBP operates most effectively at any of the 
328 ports of entry60 to the United States where it has the ability to physically inspect all cargo 
and agriculture products entering the United States, as well as screen anyone immigrating to the 
United States, whether permanently or temporarily.61  Exclusion orders issued by the ITC against 
electronic transmissions pose a serious problem for CBP.  These transmissions are not fixed on 
any tangible computer-readable medium,62 and they do not come through any ports of entry 
patrolled by CBP, and thus they cannot be the subject of “importation” as described by the 
statute63 nor can they be forfeited or seized by CBP agents.  A holding that includes electronic 
transmissions as “articles” under Section 337 would lead to competing definitions of the term 
“articles” as it is used in the statute.  As propounded by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, a statute 
should be read in such a way so that it is consistent throughout and makes sense when viewed 
                                                          
57 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CBP 
PUBLICATION NO. 1134-0915, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2014 SEIZURE STATISTICS (2015). 
58 CBP Mission Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (March 3, 2016), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/video-gallery/2016/01/cbp-mission-overview. 
59 Haberman, supra note 22, at 21-22.   
60 At Ports of Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (March 4, 2016), http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-
entry. 
61 Operations, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (March 4, 2016), http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-
entry/operations. 
62 See infra text accompanying Section V (discussing how software placed on tangible, computer-readable mediums 
has been a valid target of ITC exclusion orders and how this differs from the electronic transmission of digital data 
sets.    
63 Appellants’ Corrected Response to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 2, ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Feb. 18, 2016). 
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as a whole under the canon of “harmonious reading” of statutes.64  In short, a single word used 
many times in a statute should have a single definition; in this case, it should not mean tangible 
and capable of being seized upon entry or forfeited to the United States in one part of the statute 
while also concurrently covering intangible data transmissions that are not subject to Congress’s 
express desire to have CBP be able to police the “articles” in question.    
Furthermore, CBP does not have access to the limited number of “control points” that 
would allow an organization like CBP to monitor what information is being placed and transferred 
on the Internet.65  Even with the help and cooperation of a number of federal agencies, it appears, 
and multiple authors have suggested, a task such as excluding certain transmissions from entry 
into a country can only be accomplished with the help of Internet Service Providers.66  Such a 
level of actively monitoring transmissions and cooperation with private organizations is well 
outside the grant of power Congress gave to CBP in Section 337.67  A collaborative effort between 
federal agencies, mainly CBP, but also ICE and the FBI, and Internet Service Providers, to regulate 
traffic on the Internet in such a way also poses a variety of privacy concerns for the end-user, 
including the potential restriction of free speech and violation of end-user’s Fourth Amendment 
rights to be free from unlawful search and seizure.68  While certain “packet-sniffing” programs 
                                                          
64 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012); See also Brief of the 
Internet Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 26, ClearCorrect Operating 
LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Oct. 17, 2014).  
65 Haberman, supra note 22, at 18 (citing Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION 
POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, 205-34 at 206-07 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., MIT Press 
1999) (describing how users communicate through digital data packet switching on the Internet and control their 
inputs)).   
66 See Daniel T. Kane, Printing a War in Three Dimensions: Expending “Article” to Include Electronic Transmissions 
Before the ITC, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 463-64 (2015).  See also Haberman, supra note 22, at 21-25.  
67 See generally 19 U.S.C. §1337 (2012). 
68 Kane, supra note 66, at 463-464; for more information regarding the potential relationship between ISPs and the 
government as well as jurisdictional issues, see Haberman, supra note 22, at 22-25.  
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such as the FBI’s “Carnivore” program and Narus’s NarusInsight 8 are able to monitor Internet 
activity and have been allowed, albeit not without controversy,69 it would be difficult to extend 
the arguments that they protect national security and thwart terrorist attempts to an argument 
to protect intellectual property rights.         
III. ClearCorrect Case Origins and Current Status 
The case currently subject to a petition for en banc rehearing before the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit that concerns the main subject of this comment is an innocuous one that 
does not raise any red flags at first glance: it deals with the alleged infringement of patents 
related to orthodontic aligners.70  However, the underlying issues to be decided have far-reaching 
consequences.  To fully understand the issues involved, we will first look at the procedural history 
of the pending case. 
The origin of the case begins with a complaint filed with the ITC on behalf of Align 
Technology, Inc., manufacturers of the popular INVISALIGN® brand of orthodontic aligners, in 
March of 2012.71  The complaint alleged infringement of seven (7) U.S. Patents and violations of 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by respondents ClearCorrect Operating LLC (“CCUS”) and 
ClearCorrect Pakistan (Private), Ltd. (“CCPK”).72  CCUS and CCPK were founded by former 
directors and a former CEO of Align Technology, Inc.73  CCUS claims that it was necessary to found 
a new company that creates similar clear orthodontic aligners to Align’s products to protect the 
                                                          
69 See generally Aaron Y. Strauss, A Constitutional Crisis in the Digital Age: Why the FBI’s “Carnivore” Does Not Defy 
the Fourth Amendment, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 231 (2002); Joseph Goodman, Angela Murphy, Morgan 
Streetman, & Mark Sweet, Carnivore: Will it Devour Your Privacy?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 28 (2001). 
70 ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015) at 4-5. 
71 77 Fed. Reg. 20648-49 (April 5, 2012). 
72 Digital Models, Comm’n Op. at 2 (Apr. 9, 2015).  
73 Id. at 6. 
16 
 
smaller, independent retailers of these devices and prevent the allegedly predatory practices of 
the much larger Align Technology, Inc.74 
The patents in question are directed toward systems and methods for repositioning teeth 
by a plurality of dental aligners configured to be placed successively on a patient’s teeth with the 
end result of incrementally repositioning the patient’s teeth from an initial tooth arrangement to 
a final tooth arrangement.75  The claims at issue in the patents include both method and system 
claims.  To prove infringement of a method claim, the party bringing suit must show that the 
defendant actually performed every claimed step of the method and not just had the mere 
capability to do so.76  Accordingly, it is helpful to understand the basic claimed method that 
produces the patented apparatus. 
The dental appliances claimant alleges are being infringed are Align Technology’s 
INVISALIGN® products meant to incrementally move and position a patient’s teeth.77  The 
appliance is created by utilizing the protected method of first scanning a patient’s teeth to 
determine their starting position.78  The digital data collected in the scan is then used to create a 
three-dimensional model of the patient’s teeth.79  From this initial model, the 3D image is 
manipulated to reposition individual teeth, thus producing a series of successive data sets 
representing a series of successive tooth arrangements.80  The plurality of digital data sets are 
                                                          
74 Align Sues ClearCorrect for Making Clear Aligners Too Affordable, MARKET WIRED (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/align-sues-clearcorrect-for-making-clear-aligners-too-affordable-
1404372.htm. 
75 Digital Models, Comm’n Op. at 7; U.S. Patent No. 6,471,511 at 1.   
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78 U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22. 
79 U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22. 
80 U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 at 15; U.S. Patent No. 6,722,880 at 22. 
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used to produce a series of positive models of the series of tooth arrangements that are in turn 
used to produce the actual dental appliances as a negative of the positive models that were 
created.81  A patient will use the successive series of dental appliances to incrementally move his 
or her teeth into the ultimately-desired position. 
CCUS creates the initial digital data set by taking physical impressions of a patient’s teeth 
and scanning the stone models into FreeForm Modeling software, a 3D modeling program.82  
These data sets are sent to Pakistan where they are manipulated by CCPK to create the successive 
series of data sets that represent the incremental changes in the position of the patient’s teeth.83  
The plurality of digital data sets created by CCPK are then uploaded to CCUS’s server for use in 
the United States.84  The digital models are then used to print 3D physical models of a patient’s 
teeth which form the negative that is used to create the dental positioning adjustment appliances 
by applying thermoplastic molding over the negative.85 
An administrative law judge initially determined that the ITC had jurisdiction to prohibit 
the importation of the allegedly infringing digital data sets because, he reasoned, they are articles 
under Section 337.86  Respondents CCUS and CCPK petitioned for review of the initial 
determination and argued that the digital data sets were not articles within the meaning of 
Section 337(a)(1)(B), nor was the upload from Pakistan to a server in the United States an 
importation anticipated by Section 337(a)(1)(B).87  The ITC, however, affirmed the initial 
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determination of the administrative law judge that electronic transmissions were “articles” under 
Section 337 and the ITC had jurisdiction to regulate their importation.88  CCUS and CCPK then 
filed for judicial review before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of the ITC’s decision.   
The main point of contention between the parties is whether digital transmissions can be 
considered “articles” under Section 337 and be within the jurisdiction of the ITC.  On November 
10, 2015, a divided 2-1 panel of the Federal Circuit held that the ITC’s decision ran “counter to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”89  The panel determined that the ITC’s 
construction of “articles” to include intangible things was not entitled to Chevron deference 
because Congress’s intent was made clear through the text of the statute.90  The Chevron test 
determines whether an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is entitled to deference 
from the judiciary and comprises two questions.  First, whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue; if the answer is yes, the judiciary must give effect to Congress’s 
unambiguously expressed intent.91  If the answer is no, the reviewing court must move to the 
second question: whether “the agency’s answer to the precise question at issue is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”92   
The Federal Circuit mainly relied upon definitions of the term “article” from dictionaries 
contemporaneous with the authoring of Section 337.93  Even though the Federal Circuit’s opinion 
held Chevron step two was unnecessary, it stated that even if step two were to be reached, the 
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89 ClearCorrect Operating LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 14-1527 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2015) at 3. 
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91 Id. at 12 (citing City of Arlington, Tex. V. FCC, 133 S. CT. 1863, 1868 (2013)). 
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ITC’s interpretation of “articles” would be considered unreasonable and thus not entitled to any 
deference by a reviewing court.94   
The ITC as well as Align Technology both filed petitions for an en banc rehearing of the 
case by the full Federal Circuit bench on January 27, 2016.95  The parties claimed that the Chevron 
test was misapplied, the definition of “articles” was wrongly constructed, and a reversal of the 
panel’s decision was appropriate.  Appellants ClearCorrect filed its response on February 18, 2016 
and, among other arguments presented in favor of affirming the panel’s decision, claimed that 
appellees did not present a Chevron argument until after oral arguments.96   
IV. Historical Statutory Interpretation of “Articles” and Whether Data Transmissions Should 
be Within the ITC’s Jurisdiction 
 
Traditionally, “articles” that infringe a valid and enforceable intellectual property right or 
arise from a patented process have been construed narrowly to include solely tangible items.97  
This included things like copyrighted books, trademarked products like designer clothes or shoes, 
or reproductions of patented goods, but did not extend to digital communications.  The language 
of Section 337 has never been interpreted to include transmissions of data, and the existing ways 
of transmitting information and data at the time of the ITC’s creation were not placed under their 
jurisdiction.  A look into the history of the statutory interpretation of the terms in Section 337 or 
its predecessors better allows an observer to determine what the intent of Congress was when 
the statute was written.  
                                                          
94 Id. at 31. 
95 Petition of Appellee International Trade Commission for Rehearing En Banc, ClearCorrect, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 27, 2016); Intervenor Align Technology, Inc.’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, ClearCorrect, No. 2014-1527 (Fed. 
Cir. Jan. 27, 2016). 
96 Appellants’ Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 63, at 3, 5. 
97 Kane, supra note 66, at 438. 
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First it should be established that, as early as 1887, the Supreme Court differentiated 
between articles of commerce and data transmissions.98  In Western Union, the Court 
contemplated whether it should consider telegrams to be articles of commerce.99  Although there 
are clear technological differences between telegraphs and digital data transmissions of the 21st 
century, they seem to be analogous in not only their respective technological breakthroughs at 
the time but also in how people communicated and transferred information across long 
distances.  One could make the argument that telegrams and telegraphs were to the 19th century 
what the Internet is to the 21st century today.  In its opinion determining that telegrams were not 
articles of commerce, the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he telegraph transports nothing visible and tangible; it carries 
only ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence.  Other commerce 
requires the constant attention and supervision of the carrier for 
the safety of the persons and property carried.  The message of the 
telegraph passes at once beyond the control of the sender, and 
reaches the office to which it is sent instantaneously.  It is plain, 
from these essentially different characteristics, that the regulations 
suitable for one of these kinds of commerce would be entirely 
inapplicable to the other.100   
If the quoted passage, written over 120 years ago, were shown to someone today that 
was told it was written about the Internet and digital transmissions of information, the argument 
could be made that it would be accepted.  The Supreme Court considered a related issue 50 years 
after its opinion in Western Union.  In 1945, the Court interpreted the statutory text “articles or 
subjects of commerce” and determined that telegraph messages were “subjects” of commerce 
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as opposed to “articles” of commerce.101  Of note in that decision, the Court held that “goods” 
were “articles or subjects of commerce” and the telegraph message itself became a subject of 
commerce and not an article, but the Court declined to decide whether the electronic impulses 
into which the words of the message are transformed were “goods.”102   
Furthermore, the schedules included with the Tariff Act of 1930103 imposed duties on all 
manner of goods and articles, but they do not even a single time mention “telegraph messages, 
radio broadcasts, telephone calls, or other transmissions.”104  The things that the schedules do 
impose duties on are the equipment necessary to facilitate things like electronic transmissions; 
that is, telephone poles, wires, devices, etc. but not the data transmission itself.105  The grammar 
and actual words used by Congress at the time can be looked to for guidance as well.  Every time 
the legislature used the term “articles” in the Tariff Act, they were describing tangible things.106  
A basic tenant of statutory construction is that intrinsic evidence is used to determine the 
meaning of the word, and that a term should generally be read the same way every time it 
appears in a statute.107  
A final consideration regarding the historical jurisdiction of the ITC is related to another 
federal agency, the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”).  Just four years after the passing 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, the Communication Act of 1934 established the FCC which was 
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publicized as a “centralizing authority … with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire 
and radio communication.”108  The FCC was created to have “regulatory power over all forms of 
electronic communication.”109   
Admittedly it is difficult to determine where one agency’s jurisdiction ends and another’s 
begins, but the FCC has exclusive regulatory power over matters involving use of the radio 
frequency spectrum.110  The FCC’s jurisdiction over electronic transmissions on the Internet can 
be further evidenced by the fact that recent attempts at regulating conduct on, and active 
surveillance of, the Internet and its content has gone through the FCC.111  Taken as a whole, the 
Supreme Court’s holding of telegraphs as “subjects” and not “articles” of commerce as well as 
recent actions by the FCC combined with the temporal proximity of the Tariff Act of 1930 that 
established Section 337 and the Communications Act of 1934 that established the FCC, can be 
taken as proof that Congress intended to create a bifurcation between tangible “articles” 
governed by the ITC and “electronic communications” governed by the FCC. 
A. The Journey from Telegraphs to the Internet and the Intent of Congress 
It was not the intent of the authors of the statute to include the presently-discussed types 
of electronic transmissions under the Act’s umbrella.  We now clearly understand the 
technological differences between telegrams and massive Internet transmissions, but the 
interpreter must put themselves in the shoes of the authors of the statute and determine what 
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they would think based on their knowledge of the time.  Although the authors of the statute 
could not have contemplated the breadth and innovations that the Internet would bring as well 
as the amount of information that could be sent in a single message, the basic underlying theory 
of the decisions cited above still stands: that tangible instruments sending the signals are articles 
and the transient electronic information being sent through the articles are subjects of commerce 
and not articles themselves.  Congress at the time also may not have been able to contemplate 
the Internet per se, but they could easily understand the international transmission of 
telecommunications data.112  If Congress wished to include intangible data among articles of 
commerce, Congress would have made that clear when they drafted the Tariff Act of 1930.  
The comparison between telegraphs and the Internet continues beyond Congress 
knowing of telegraphs’ existence and that they can carry intangible data.  Telegraphy itself is the 
process of using a form of communication known to both sender and receiver to transmit data.113  
Such a definition could be used also to explain what it is the Internet “does.”  Miriam Webster 
defines a telegraph as “an apparatus for communication at a distance by coded signals; 
especially: an apparatus, system, or process for communication at a distance by electric 
transmission over wire.”114  When reduced to its purest form, the digital data sets at issue in 
ClearCorrect are exactly that – coded signals communicated over a distance by electric 
transmission.  Another telegraphic example would be Morse Code.  When considering Morse 
Code, which employs a series of long and short electric signals to form letters of the alphabet, it 
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is not a long stretch of the imagination to envision the long and short dashes and dots being the 
“ones and twos” of binary code of their day.   
Another similar parallel of the digital transmissions in question here to a technology long-
existing at the time the statute was written is the operation of computers and a type of optical 
telegraphy known as the shutter telegraph.  When two modern computers exchange a byte, or 
an eight-bit binary number, they are performing a task that is functionally similar to the actions 
that an eight-panel shutter telegraph115 would have done 200 years ago, which was also 
understood and contemplated by Congress when they wrote the Tariff Act in 1930.116  The 
difference, outside the obvious of electricity and use of relay stations, is that a computer today 
may use ASCII instead of a codebook to relate each combination of eight-bit sequences into a 
different word or action.117   
Furthermore, the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) determines the 
protocols used by modems currently, but the ITU was originally founded as the International 
Telegraph Union in 1865 with the goal of regulating international telegraphy.118  Clearly the 
operators of the ITU, part of the United Nations system, saw the close parallel between 
telegraphy and the technology that allows us to communicate over the Internet.  Accordingly, it 
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should not be considered lightly that the Tariff Act intentionally did not include telegraphs, whose 
modern day equivalent is arguably digital data transmissions over the Internet.  
In general, many similarities can be drawn between telegraphs and the Internet.  The 
telegraph served as the infrastructure for dynamic globalization of economic activities in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries;119 the two technologies were the defining communications 
technology of their respective eras; and perhaps most significantly, the legacy for both 
technologies is the increase in the speed of long-distance communications.120  There have even 
been scholars that have presented arguments that all things being considered, the telegraph had 
a greater impact on communications than the Internet.121   
Because of all these various analogs between telegraphs and current digital transmission 
of data, it is not a far stretch of the imagination to believe that when Congress excluded 
telegraphs and telegrams from their understanding of “articles” in 1930, they also were intending 
to exclude similar future technologies such as electronic transmissions over the Internet.  
Accordingly, the electronic transmissions in questions should be excluded from being considered 
“articles” within the interpretation of Section 337. 
V. The ITC’s Past Treatment of Digital Data  
An en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should affirm the panel’s decision and 
not accept the ITC’s interpretation that intangible electronic transmissions are “articles” not only 
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because Congress never intended for the ITC to have such far-reaching jurisdiction, but also 
because the interpretation the ITC seeks would vastly expand the jurisdiction it has asserted up 
until this point.  In the final Commission Opinion, the majority acknowledged the construction of 
the term “articles” is a difficult one because the term itself is not defined in the statute.122  
Furthermore, in his dissent to the commission’s opinion, Commissioner Johanson referred to 
whether the electronic transmission of digital data into the United States constitutes importation 
of an “article” as an issue of first impression.123  To allow the ITC to determine what they do and 
do not have jurisdiction over on an ad hoc basis would stop the ITC from being a creature of 
statute and transform it into a creature of its own making.  In the Initial Determination in 
ClearCorrect, the ITC held it had specific jurisdiction over digital data sets because they were 
“articles” under Section 337 and specifically pointed to three prior cases that it claimed shows 
electronically transmitted data has always been considered to be an “article” under Section 
337.124   
The first, and most recent, case is one where in 2007 the ITC issued a cease and desist 
order barring the electronic transmission of infringing antivirus software.125  The ITC also issued 
a limited exclusion order, but that order only excluded the infringing antivirus software in a 
tangible medium.126  The ITC reasoned that, although it believed itself to have jurisdiction over 
electronic data, it did not believe Customs and Border Protection had the resources to enforce 
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an exclusion order against intangible items,127 hence why they did not include them in the 
exclusion order.  However, the ITC believed that a cease and desist order that did not include 
electronic transmissions of the infringing antivirus software would “allow for an obvious method 
of circumvention such that the cease and desist order would be rendered meaningless.”128 
The cease and desist order was aimed at antivirus software in the United States because 
it was shown that the respondent had a commercially significant inventory of infringing products 
in the country already.129  The commission determined there was no difference between the 
electronic transmissions of the software or software that was transferred to a tangible 
medium.130   
Whereas the software in question was a finished product, ready to be installed and run 
on a computer, the digital data sets at issue in ClearCorrect are not software.131  The digital data 
sets do not control functions or direct operations like the antivirus software.132  Also, in contrast 
to the above situation where the ITC issued a cease and desist order against electronic 
transmissions in an effort to stop circumvention of the order to not sell the antivirus software on 
tangible mediums, ClearCorrect’s digital data sets are not stored on a disk or any other tangible 
medium; they are purely electronic.  Furthermore, the antivirus software of the respondent in 
the above case was directly infringing the claimant’s patent because it performed every step of 
the protected method.  Here, not every step of the method is infringed; the digital data sets are 
no less than three steps removed before they could be in an infringing state. 
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In Certain Set Top Boxes and Components Thereof (“Set Top Boxes”), the ITC determined 
there was no Section 337 violation in respondent’s importation of television boxes that 
downloaded software to display a guide of programs airing on various television networks.133  
The ITC stated in dicta that Section 337 is “broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair 
practice, including the transmission of infringing software by electronic means ….”.134  In its 
holding, however, the ITC declined to issue any remedial orders directed to the products at issue, 
specifically rejecting a proposition to issue an exclusion order directed at satellite transmissions 
of allegedly infringing software and/or program schedule data even if the commission found a 
violation of Section 337.135  However, similar to the antivirus software case above, the ITC noted 
that should a violation be found, the ITC could issue a cease and desist order prohibiting the 
electronic transmission of respondents’ software which is found to infringe the asserted claims 
at issue.136  
 Again, however, the ITC is playing both sides: it claims to be able to regulate electronic 
transmissions of software, but only would allow itself to do so through a cease and desist order 
and not an exclusion order because of its deference to the practical capabilities of CBP.137  This is 
another point of contention in the ongoing litigation.  Can a cease and desist order be authorized 
in a situation where an exclusion order is unavailable?  Section 337’s language leads to the 
conclusion that a cease and desist order is designed to accompany an exclusion order, or be a 
step toward what could ultimately be an exclusion order.138  A cease and desist order can be 
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issued “[i]n addition to” or “in lieu of” an exclusion order.139  Clearly a cease and desist order 
cannot be “in addition to” an exclusion order in a situation where an exclusion order is 
unavailable.  Proponents of reversing the ITC’s decision in Digital Models have said as much, 
stating that cease and desist orders are meant to be “a supplemental remedy that was never 
intended to gap-fill situations where an exclusion order would be illogical.”140 
Furthermore, a cease and desist order that is issued “in lieu of” an exclusion order may 
be “modif[ied] or revoke[d] and, in the case of revocation, [the ITC] may [issue an exclusion 
order].”141  This language can be interpreted rationally only if a cease and desist order is a limited 
version of an exclusion order and rightly considered a step on the path to securing an exclusion 
order, and not an “independent alternative.”142  To hold that a cease and desist order can 
function as a stand-alone remedy and ignore the interplay between the two remedial measures 
would produce an unharmonious interpretation of a statute.143  As stated in one of the many 
briefs submitted to the Federal Circuit, by interpreting the statute to include intangible things as 
“articles,” the ITC is “[c]reating a statutory liability that inherently cannot be remedied by the 
only enforcement tools provided” and would be a presumptively unreasonable statutory 
construction.144 
Finally, reaching the case that provided the impetus for the two previously-cited ITC 
adjudications, in Certain Hardware Logic Emulation Systems and Components Thereof 
(“Hardware Logic”), the ITC issued a permanent limited exclusion order and a permanent cease 
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and desist order against respondent Mentor.145  The orders were directed to the accused 
“hardware logic emulation systems and component thereof, including software.”146 (emphasis 
added)  The products in question comprised hardware and software that temporarily embodied 
substantial digital logic networks used to design and test the electronic circuits of semiconductor 
devices.147  In a twist from the two adjudications already discussed, the exclusion order and the 
cease and desist order also covered the software needed to run the devices, which could be 
electronically transmitted into the United States.148  The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 
reasoned that the software was an integral part of the infringing emulation system and was thus 
contributorily infringing a valid U.S. intellectual property right.149  The ALJ stated that the 
software bore “a direct relationship to the infringing imported emulation systems.150  
Proponents of an interpretation of Section 337 that would include intangible things as 
articles point to Hardware Logic as ITC precedent that shows it has jurisdiction over electronic 
transmission of data, but that is a misinterpretation of what Hardware Logic says.  The imported 
article at issue in Hardware Logic was a tangible emulation system that required software to run 
it.  The software could be included with the hardware at the time of importation or put on a disc 
or other tangible medium and installed at a later time.  The ITC determined that no customer 
would purchase the emulation system if they did not have access to the software.151  It was the 
software on a tangible, computer-readable medium – a physical article capable of importation – 
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that the ITC entered an exclusion order against.  It was only to avoid a circumvention of its 
exclusion order that the ITC issued a cease and desist order that targeted the electronic 
transmission of the software.152  This line of reasoning was also used in the two previously-cited 
adjudications to validate the issuance of a cease and desist order directed toward electronic 
transmissions of software.   
Responding to this way of using cease and desist orders, in his dissent in Digital Models 
Commissioner Johanson stated that the “Commission’s remedy may go beyond merely stopping 
the actual violation that triggered the Commission’s jurisdiction and also include ‘reasonably 
related’ acts that would result in circumvention of the Commission’s order.”153  This cease and 
desist order targeting electronic transmissions of software would come under the previously-
stated unreasonable statutory construction because the electronic transmission of the software 
is not something that could be stopped by exclusion order.  Assuming arguendo that the ITC can 
issue cease and desist orders against things that cannot be reached by an exclusion order as 
discussed above, further argument can be made to distinguish the three prior adjudications and 
ClearCorrect.   
In ClearCorrect, the ITC is asserting original jurisdiction over the electronic transmissions 
that it would be illogical to issue an exclusion order against whereas in Hardware Logic the cease 
and desist order was directed to something imported as part of an infringing emulation system 
that the ITC had jurisdiction over.154  In other words, the cease and desist order in Hardware Logic 
actually was designed to stop respondent from circumventing the exclusion order while the 
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recommendations of the ALJ in Digital Models were not.  Any remedial order that issues in Digital 
Models would ignore the circumvention aspect of the equation and support an understanding 
that the ITC has original jurisdiction over the digital data sets regardless of the existence of an 
exclusion order directed to tangible articles that no one contests the ITC has jurisdiction over.    
The prior ITC adjudications discussed above are all examples of software that could be 
used in its current state to infringe another product.  The only step that needed to take place was 
the software being transferred to a tangible medium and it would be excluded through the 
exclusion order.  The argument can be made that there is a limit to the degrees of separation 
between the data transmissions in question and the ultimately infringing product.  The Hardware 
Logic order reached object code as well as source code, arguably “one step removed” from usable 
binary because source code is not executable by the emulation system until it is compiled into 
computer-readable object code.155  The ITC determined that the source code in Hardware Logic 
contributorily infringed the products at use and could be the target of a remedial order because 
the “substance – the intellectual property – of software is most clearly embodied in the 
programmer’s source code.”156 
The digital data sets in ClearCorrect are not infringing articles because they are multiple 
steps removed from an infringing product that Section 337 seeks keep out of the country.  The 
“substance” that the ITC spoke about in Hardware Logic is too distant to be used against the data 
sets.  The data transmissions at issue in ClearCorrect are not virtual representations of the dental 
appliances worn by patients.157  The data sets, once received in the United States, have to be first 
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loaded into a software program to make them machine-readable.158  Next, the machine-readable 
data must be sent to an appropriate apparatus that can read the data and make the physical 
models of the dental appliances, such as a 3D printer.159  Lastly, plastic must be shaped over the 
physical model to create a negative model to finally end up with the true dental appliance.160  
The data sets at issue are at a minimum three steps removed from being the physical dental 
appliance.  Rather than being an infringing thing itself, the digital data sets, which by their nature 
of being electronic should not be considered “articles” under Section 337 at all, are actually a 
“transmission of information made during a manufacturing process.”161   
However, while this reading would have no digital data set ever be an infringing article by 
its very nature, opponents of this line of reasoning will allege even if the data transmissions are 
not “articles that infringe,” they still can be properly considered to represent part of a patented 
process or a step in a method claim of a patent in question and thus the importer may be liable 
for inducing infringement downstream.  At the time the original briefs in ClearCorrect were filed, 
induced infringement downstream without direct infringement at the time of importation was 
not possible.  However, with a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the 
interpretation of induced infringement has changed.      
VI. The Suprema Decision and Induced Infringement  
Suprema dealt with the ITC’s interpretation that Section 337 did in fact cover the 
importation of goods that, after importation, are used by the importer to directly infringe at the 
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inducement of the goods’ seller.162  The facts of the case involve the importation of optical 
scanning devices and the ITC’s issuance of an exclusion order directed to the scanning devices 
under the theory that the importer was inducing a third party to infringe a valid U.S. patent.163  
The scanning devices themselves were not “articles that infringe” at the time of import, but they 
included a software development kit (“SDK”) to generate the software that was necessary to 
operate the devices.164  An American company used the SDK’s to write its own software and then 
bundled and resold the scanners and software in the U.S.165   
The ITC determined that Suprema, the foreign company, willfully blinded itself to the 
American company’s activities and “deliberately shielded itself from the infringing activities it 
actively encouraged and facilitated [the American company] to make.”166  The parallel in the 
current case would be CCPK is inducing CCUS to infringe valid intellectual property rights held by 
Align.  A main contention to keep in mind is that the optical scanners of Suprema were tangible 
goods, subject to the original jurisdiction of the ITC and its remedial powers, whereas the data 
sets in ClearCorrect are intangible.     
In Suprema, the Federal Circuit determined that the ITC’s actions were due to an 
interpretation of their statutory grant of power and conducted a Chevron analysis.167  The court 
held that Section 337 was ambiguous as to inducement to infringe without direct infringement 
at the time of importation.168  The majority determined the main legal question was whether 
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there could be an “article that infringes” at the time of importation when the infringement did 
not happen until well after the importation.169  In its discussion of the issue, the Federal Circuit 
focused not on “articles” but on “infringe” and what Congress’s intent was when they wrote 
“articles that infringe.”170  The court held that the infringement Congress was referring to was 
not simply direct infringement at the time of importation, but also indirect infringement including 
induced infringement after importation.171  Thus, the court held that the ITC’s reading of “articles 
that infringe” in Section 337 to include “goods that were used by an importer to directly infringe 
post-importation as a result of the seller’s inducement” is reasonable and deserving of Chevron 
deference.172   
Suprema can be distinguished from ClearCorrect by a simple but important difference: 
the goods at issue in Suprema were physical, tangible optical scanners while the alleged “articles” 
in ClearCorrect were intangible data transmissions.  The argument was not presented in Suprema 
that the ITC never had jurisdiction over the objects being imported themselves; rather, the 
argument was whether the ITC had the right to exclude a non-infringing good at the time of 
import if the seller was inducing downstream infringement.   
Furthermore, it was suggested by the dissent that no ambiguity in the statutory language 
actually exists, and the majority strained to find an ambiguity where there was none in order to 
rationalize providing the ITC’s interpretation with Chevron deference.173  According to their 
reasoning, and the justification provided by the majority, the case was decided on public policy 
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grounds; however, the judiciary is not the proper place to address public policy concerns – that 
task is left to Congress.174  In dissent, four judges of the nine-judge court sitting en banc went on 
to agree that “[t]he majority fails … to identify an actual ambiguity in the statute” and that the 
“word ‘articles’ is not ambiguous – it has a well-defined legal definition.”175  It appears at least 
four judges on the Federal Circuit spoke to the direct point that is at issue in this comment as 
well as a potential en banc rehearing: that “article” connotes a physical, tangible object and is 
not ambiguous.176 
The majority also interchanges the terms “goods” and “articles” throughout its opinion, 
further lending credence to the opinion that articles are tangible things.  Counsel for ClearCorrect 
pointed out as much to the panel, arguing that the Suprema majority’s treatment of the two 
terms as synonyms “comports with the [ITC’s] past position that electronic data is different from 
the traditional concept of ‘articles.’”177  Using the Suprema majority’s public policy argument that 
Section 337 was designed “to stop the entry of goods at the border,” an argument can be further 
made in support of the panel’s holding in ClearCorrect that the electronic data transmissions are 
not “goods” by any dictionary or legal definition, and thus are not subject to the ITC’s 
jurisdiction.178 
The Suprema decision, although seemingly closely related to the decision in ClearCorrect, 
is distinguishable on multiple levels and mainly concerns a different area of original jurisdiction 
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that Congress granted to the ITC.  The holding in Suprema expressly speaks to the definition of 
“infringement” at the time of importation, but not to what exactly the “articles” are that the ITC 
has the ability to exclude from importation.  Because the tangible products in Suprema were later 
combined with intangible electronic data to create infringing products that gave rise to the 
finding of indirect infringement of the seller, many importers and indeed courts may look to the 
Suprema decision for guidance on matters that fall more properly under the ClearCorrect 
umbrella.  This presents an uncertain area in the law that the Supreme Court can clarify if it were 
to hear arguments related to ClearCorrect and Suprema should the Federal Circuit sitting en banc 
disagree with the panel’s decision.    
VII. Conclusion 
The ClearCorrect case presents an opportunity for the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, sitting en banc, or the Supreme Court, to clarify an area of the law that has been 
misinterpreted by the agency tasked with enforcing it.  A reviewing court should affirm the 
present panel decision because it is in accordance with the unambiguously expressed intention 
of Congress.  This has been shown through Congress’s understanding of technology at the time 
it wrote the statute, and reinforced by the inconsistent, if not impossible, enforcement of 
remedial orders that would result from a reading of the statute that equated “articles” with 
intangible, electronic transmissions.   
Moreover, it was also shown that the present enforcement mechanisms for the ITC’s 
remedial orders cannot properly function to stop the transmission of digital data packets in its 
current form.  Any reviewing court, in denying the ITC’s authority to regulate the electronic 
transmission of data and other intangible things, would also be providing a public service by 
38 
 
sending a message to Congress that if indeed it wishes to imbue the ITC with such power, it must 
also provide a way for the agency to enforce that power.  A partnership with Internet Service 
Providers, an expansion of the cross-agency cooperation that already exists, or the creation of a 
new entity to regulate the transmissions in question are potential remedies, but that is a task 
that must be left to Congress.  By the letter of the law that Congress clearly set forth, the ITC 
does not have the power to exclude digital data transmissions into the United States and thus 
the panel decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must be affirmed by a reviewing 
court.    
